This article analyzes the social nature of everyday corruption. The economic, institutional, and socio-cultural factors of corruption are discussed, and its root causes are revealed based on various theoretical approaches and empirical research. The study explains everyday corruption relationships using the "agent-client" model. The correlation between the level of corruption and societal moral norms, transparency of public administration, and economic conditions is analyzed. Additionally, scientific conclusions are drawn regarding the negative impact of corruption on economic growth and methods for its reduction.

Domestic corruption, social nature, economic factors, institutional reasons, socio-cultural factors, agent-client model, transparency, public administration, economic growth, fight against corruption.

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