Strong linkages between autocrats and the military are often seen as a necessary condition for authoritarian regime survival in the face of uprising. The Arab Spring of 2011 supports this contention: the armed forces in Libya and Syria suppressed the mass protests, while the military in Tunisia and Egypt refused to engage in the counterinsurgency efforts. To better understand these divergent outcomes, the following paper examines the factors that affect civil-military linkages in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. The paper argues that there are three main methods through which autocrats can either increase or decrease their cohesiveness with the armed forces: counterbalancing the military, distributing patronage or material benefits, and institutionalizing the military. Through these methods, autocrats can boost the loyalty of armed forces, improve the robustness of coercive apparatus, or place constraints on the power of the army, which, in turn, influence the military propensity to support the regime during mass uprisings.

Arab spring, revolutions,, Arab world

Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking Press, 1963: 112-150.

Арипов Шавкат “Aраб баҳори”нинг кутилган мевалари кутилган натижаларни бердими? // “Uzbekistan-China: development of cultural, historical, scientific and economic relations”, 2021 – B.495

Bellin, Eva. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-157.

Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds, Masoud, Tarek E., and Reynolds, Andrew. “Introduction: The Third Arab Spring.” The Arab Spring : Pathways of Repression and Reform. First ed. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015: 1-15.

Carvajal, Fernando. “Military Restructuring in Yemen: Unravelling a Tangled Web.” Comment Middle East, April 26, 2012. https://web.archive.org/web/20121204053839/http://co-mmentmideast.com/2012/04/military-restructuring-yemen/ .

Geddes, Barbara. “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” MS, University of California, Los Angeles, 2006: 1-30.

Makara, Michael. "Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring." Defense & Security Analysis 32, no. 3 (2016): 209-223.

Muhammadsiddiqov M. Xorijiy sharq va g’arb mamlakatlarida ijtimoiy – siyosiy jarayonlar - T : O’zbekiston xalqaro islom akademiyasi- 2019 .–b.16

Nassif, Hicham. "Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt's Military Elite, 1981-2011." The Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (2013): 509-530.

Nassif, Hicham Bou. "Generals and Autocrats: How Coup‐Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite's Behavior in the Arab Spring." Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 (2015): 245-275.

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military‐Opposition Alliances." Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 4 (2011): 485-491.

Ross, Michael Lewin. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-361.