Close engagement with Yemen has been one of the pillars of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy since the founding of modern Saudi Arabia in 1932. Saudi Arabia's policy towards Yemen has been shaped by four main factors: Yemen's foreign and domestic policy; regional and international events; the nature of the Saudi regime and its decision-making mechanisms; and the political and security implications of having a long common border. Saudi Arabia experienced three major political events in the south: the 1962 revolution in North Yemen, [1] the rise of the socialist regime in South Yemen in 1967, [2] and the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990.[3] Riyadh has used a range of soft power tools, including a network of local alliances providing economic aid and propagating its Sunni Islamic ideology – Salafi-Wahhabism – to maximize its political influence in times of stability and wage proxy wars in times of conflict. Prior to the current conflict, direct Saudi military intervention was limited to defending its border areas, such as the 1969 war with the leftist government in Aden and the 2009 war with the Houthi (Ansar Allah) armed movement.

Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Houthis (Ansar Allah),

Tawfeeq al-Ganad, “September 26 revolution and regional transformations: How Saudi Arabia tightened its grip on the first republican regime in the Arabian Peninsula [AR],” Khuyut, September 26, 2020, https://www.khuyut.com/blog/09-25-2020-0september

Bruce Riedel, “Saudi Arabia and the civil war within Yemen’s civil war,” Brookings Institute, August 15, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/08/15/saudi-arabia-and-the-civil-war-within-yemens-civil-war/

Mark Katz, “Yemeni unity and Saudi security,” in Political Transformations in Yemen, Western Studies and Research, 1990-1994 (Sana’a: The American Center for Yemeni Studies, 1995).

In the 1950s, colonial power Britain unilaterally established a border between Saudi Arabia and its eastern protectorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra. Riyadh did not recognize the British demarcation line, retaining military control of the two border areas. See Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Helen Lackner, “Socialist Revolution in Arabia,” Orient Magazine, November 30, 2017, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/article2157

In 1979, clashes broke out between the Sana’a and Aden regimes. Northern leader Ali Abdullah Saleh secured weaponry from Moscow that enabled Sana’a to eliminate an Aden-backed insurgency. Before his assassination in 1977, President Ibrahim al-Hamdi planned to pursue unification with the southern leadership.

Unity would allow a settlement of border issues from a position of strength. Aden had also begun discussing a transition to a market economic model, which would have more legitimacy in the context of unification. The Saudi foreign and finance ministers were in Aden three days before Saleh visited in November 1989 to sign the unity agreement. Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) politburo member Jarallah Omar (d. 2002) outlined Aden’s thinking in his memoirs: “I recall that [YSP general secretary] Ali Salem al-Beidh and others said explicitly: We should speed up the establishment of Yemeni unity before we become an oil state. This was a very important point. Ali Salem al-Beidh held on to his opinion which we all agreed with, as we wanted unity before the south could become an oil state. The people in the south and many others will oppose unity and they are going to want Aden and the south to be the same as the small Gulf states.” See “Jarallah Omar’s Memoirs – 7 [AR],” Bidayat, Issue 22, 2019, https://bidayatmag.com/node/1003

According to diplomats in the north and south, communications between Riyadh and the YSP were established in 1991, managed by party officials Mohammed al-Qaiti and Ahmed Obeid bin Dagher and helped by Prime Minister Abu Bakr al-Attas’s good ties with Saudi Arabia. When Al-Beidh declared secession in May 1994 he appointed Abdul Rahman Al-Jifri, leader of a pro-Saudi faction, as his deputy and Al-Attas as prime minister.

Many Yemeni researchers believe the decision to secede was made with Saudi support. Riyadh also backed elements of the northern army that invaded the south, tipping the balance in favor of Saleh. The aim may have been to perpetuate division, but Aden’s defeat was an unforeseen consequence.

Dua Suwaidan, “Ali Salem Al-Beidh: To Saudi Arabia he flowed [AR],” Al-Akhbar, June 2, 2015, https://al-akhbar.com/Yemen/21846

The Jeddah Agreement established the Saudi-Yemeni border based on the 1934 Treaty of Taif. In the south, the border was settled amicably with Riyadh ceding Al-Wadiah and Yemen ceding Sharurah, while the border strip was extended from Jabal Al-Thar to the Omani-Saudi border.

“US ambassador to Riyadh: King Abdullah supports Yemen’s unity but does not trust President Saleh [AR],” Al-Masdar, January 2, 2011, https://almasdaronline.com/articles/58324

Formly pro-Saleh, Abdul Rahman al-Jifri began to take a critical stance in 2007; see comments in al-Ayyam, September 19, 2007, https://www.alayyam.info/news/33UMUIO0-YYPS90

Sheikh Tariq al-Fadli was one of the most prominent figures who tried to play a leading role in the movement. In May 2009 Salafi sheikhs from Aden and Hadramawt boycotted a Salafi conference in Sana’a held to condemn the calls for secession; see “The Salafiyya in Yemen Conference Ends Its First Meeting in Sana’a and Affirms its Support for the Government against Separatists [AR],” Mareb Press, May 29, 2009, https://marebpress.net/news_details.php?lng=ar-abic&sid=16808

Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman, “Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy,” Chatham House, May 2011, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/Yemen%20Saudi%20Arabia%20Gulf%20States%20May%202011%20AR.pdf

Salwa Fadel, “Differences between Al-Beidh and Tehran cause closure of Aden Live in [Beirut’s] Dahiya suburb [AR],” Janoubia, November 7, 2014, خلاف علي البيض وطهران يقفل «عدن لايف» بالضاحية – جنوبية (janoubia.com) and “Dead and wounded in Aden, Expected visit by Al-Beidh to Iran [AR],” Yafa News, November 4, 2012, يافع نيوزقتلى وجرحى في عدن زيارة مرتقبة للبيض إلى إيران – يافع نيوز (yafa–news.net)

“An Armed Movement Resumes Activities in Southern Yemen [AR],” Al Jazeera.Net, June 24, 2011, حركة مسلحة تعاود نشاطها جنوب اليمن | يمن أخبار | الجزيرة نت (aljazeera.net)

For more on Houthi strategy see “Saudi policy towards the Houthis before Operation Decisive Storm: A Reading of Positions and Transformations [AR],” Arab Policy Forum, no date available, السياسة السعودية تجاه الحوثيين قبل عاصفة الحزم.. قراءة في المواقف والتحولات – منتدى السياسات العربية (alsiasat.com)

Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman, “Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy,” Chatham House, May 2011, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/Yemen%20Saudi%20Arabia%20Gulf%20States%20May%202011%20AR.pdf

Yemeni tribal and political sources to author, March-September 2020.

Mansur al-Marzuqi, “King Salman’s one year in Al-Yamamah palace: Break or continuation? [AR]” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, January 12, 2016, https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2016/01/201611294313309689.html

Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, “Federalism in Yemen: A Catalyst for War, the Present Reality and the Inevitable Future,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, February 28, 2019, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/7124

“The secrets of Saudi Arabia’s threats to Ali Salem al-Beidh, following his escalated moves and demands in the Yemeni street for secession [AR],” Al-Quds, May 31, 2016, خفايا توجيه السعودية تهديدات لعلي سالم البيض بعد تصعيد تحركاته ومطالبه في الشارع اليمني بالإنفصال | القدس العربي (alquds.co.uk)

Salman Rashid al-Amari, “The direction of the Kuwait talks on Yemen [AR],” Al-Bayan, April 18, 2016, مسارات “مباحثات الكويت“حول اليمن (albayan.co.uk)

This is according to the statements of a senior military official in the Yemen defence ministry who is close to Riyadh and President Hadi. This was also confirmed by military sources close to the UAE in Aden.

Riyadh’s support for Hadi continued despite reservations about his performance. Riyadh pressured him in 2018 to reconcile with Abu Dhabi ahead of the Hudaydah battles with Houthi forces, though without bringing UAE allies into his government.